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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES IN HONG KONG: 




I.       INTRODUCTION 
 
Dr. Ida Kwan Lun Mak1 wrote Alternative Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Disputes in 
Hong Kong: Institutionalizing Its Effective Use2 to analyze the institutional status of alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) methods within Hong Kong economic, social and legal systems, and 
to suggest mechanisms to advance the institutionalization process.3 Hong Kong is a blossoming 
global financial hub, and its laws governing ADR are written specifically to foster more 
international business.4 However, the largest strata of Hong Kong’s economy is still comprised of 
small private limited companies, whose shareholder disputes are not well suited for resolution via 
litigation or dominant arbitral regimes.5 Dr. Mak’s goal in writing this book is to assert a theoretical 
framework by which to measure the efficacy of Hong Kong’s current legislation governing 
shareholder dispute resolution via legal and private means.6 The author guides the reader through 
her research by truncating the book into three sections: the developmental history of ADR in Hong 
Kong shareholder disputes, the institutional acceptance and legitimacy of ADR, and her suggested 
future legislative adaptations to regulations governing ADR in shareholder disputes.7 Dr. Mak 
concludes that ADR systems employed in Hong Kong shareholder disputes are almost fully 
institutionalized, before proposing policy options to expedite the process and improve the standing 
of ADR as a potential solution to shareholder disputes.8  
  
 
* David Huehnergarth is the Books and Literature Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2020 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University School of Law. 
 
1 Dr. Ida Kwan Lun Mak is employed at the University of Hong Kong Department of Law as research assistant. Her 
research is specialized in empirical studies of the company laws, alternative dispute resolution methods, and 
sociolegal studies employed in Hong Kong. This book is an adaptation of her doctoral thesis, of which the 
underlying research was supervised by Katherine Lynch. (IDA KWAN LUN MAK, Alternative Dispute Resolution of 
Shareholder Disputes in Hong Kong: Institutionalizing Its Effective Use xi-xiii (2017)). 
 
2 DR. IDA KWAN LUN MAK, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES IN HONG KONG: 
INSTITUTIONALIZING ITS EFFECTIVE USE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (2017). 
 
3 Id. at 16.  
 
4 Id. at 3, 32.   
 
5 Id. at 3-10. 
 
6 Id. at 18. 
 
7 Mak, supra note 2, at vii-viii. 
 




 Dr. Mak uses this book to analyze the progression of institutionalization and to present 
findings into what is preventing further progression,9 yet she does not properly consider the most 
fundamental element of all types of adjudication; parties and lawyers are self-interested, seeking 
outcomes that are as favorable to them as possible.10 For example, Dr. Mak explains that parties 
in Hong Kong shareholder disputes are often personally affiliated, and are primarily motivated by 
personal desires for money and power.11 Dr. Mak then fails to recognize such motivations as 
potential reasons for clients to refuse to employ ADR on judicial or professional advice.12 
Similarly, Dr. Mak states that Hong Kong lawyers have monopolized their profession to preserve 
the level of their social status and financial compensation,13 then fails to consider the obvious when 
questioning why those same lawyers are less likely to utilize or encourage less expensive, more 
expedient ADR systems to resolve their client’s shareholder disputes.14 Despite such flaws, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Disputes in Hong Kong: Institutionalizing Its 
Effective Use is still a thorough study that offers compelling legislative options to advance ADR. 
Though the ideas presented are incredibly complicated, that depth offers substantial weight to Dr. 
Mak’s array of programs and reforms tailored to advance the institutional progress of ADR in 
Hong Kong shareholder disputes. Overall, the book is an insightful and informative foray into 
Hong Kong shareholder dispute resolution, but the flaws in both its constructive and argumentative 
structure chip away at any persuasive weight it may hold. 
 
II.  OVERVIEW 
 
 Expressed through eight chapters spanning three main sections,15 this book’s overarching 
argument is that ADR is more institutionalized in Hong Kong due to its growing usage by parties 
and lawyers and also because of mandates made by the Hong Kong legislature and judiciary to 
encourage parties to solve their disputes through ADR.16 The Hong Kong legal system enshrines 
an imbalance of power between the city’s historically powerful industrial lobbies and the general 
public interest.17 This imbalance is highlighted by a constitutional right to the freedom to contract 
 
9 Mak, supra note 2, at 216. 
 
10 Id. at 132, 158. 
 
11 Id. at 132. 
 
12 Id. at 137, 145. 
 
13 Id. at 158. 
 
14 Mak, supra note 2, at 169. 
 
15 Id. at 28. 
 
16 Id. at 226. 
 
17 See, e.g., id. at 125 (“[b]ig business enterprises and professional groups in Hong Kong have exerted their political 




and the public’s guaranteed access to courts18; even though people are guaranteed a chance to 
plead their case, the fundamental purpose of the Hong Kong legal system is to maximize and 
maintain economic growth.19 The recent surge in the use of ADR in shareholder disputes is 
paralleled by a dearth of legislation and judicial guidance governing ADR, subsequently pressuring 
the government to introduce new policies that promote ADR while maintaining the balance 
between business and civilian interests.20 Dr. Mak discusses the facets of this legislative gap in the 
three sections of this book. 
First, Dr. Mak addresses how dispute resolution methods in Hong Kong dramatically 
shifted as the city ascended into a global financial hub; as Hong Kong bloomed, so too did the 
number of suits filed in its courts, leading to extensive docket backlogs and a coequal pressure to 
clear them.21 One such means is the legislative endorsement of ADR, and chapter three identifies 
and develops methodologies to study the current ADR policy, and its reception in the Hong Kong 
legal community.22 Comprising chapters four, five and six, part II explains the socio-legal and 
empirical analysis of how ADR processes can further consolidate institutional legitimacy in the 
law, court rules, and directives, and in the eyes of the Hong Kong legal community.23 Part III is a 
singular, forward-looking chapter, which probes the potential for new law governing company 
composition and shareholder actions by analyzing similar international schemes for whatever 
teachings they can provide on the proper implementation of a court-based ADR system.24 Finally, 
Dr. Mak uses a conclusory chapter to summarize her findings from each part and emphasizes the 
need for more mechanisms to study Hong Kong dispute resolution only grows as the system 
changes.25 If ADR is ever to achieve full institutionalization, the Hong Kong government and 
judiciary need clear and objective guidelines, not endless empirical studies, before they can adopt 
ADR into comprehensive legislation.26 
 
18 Xianggang Jiben Fa art. 35, § 1, art. 109 §1, art. 110 (H.K.). 
 
19 Mak, supra note 2, at 32 (Dr. Mak cites Articles 35, 109, and 110 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which state, 
respectively, that the right to a court date is unfettered, that the Hong Kong government shall act to maintain the 
city’s status as an international financial center, and that the law must safeguard the free operation of business. 
Xianggang Jiben Fa art. 35, § 1, art. 109 §1, art. 110 (H.K.)). 
 
20 Id. at 72-73. 
 
21 Id. at 32, 217. (the author ties the origin of the shift towards ADR to the construction industry, specifically the 
Hong Kong Airport Core Programme, which successfully showed the benefits of mediation and other ADR 
methods). 
 
22 Id. at 45-67. 
 
23 Id. at 32.   
 
24 Mak, supra note 2 at 181-215. 
 
25 Id. at 216-31. 
 
26 Id. at 230 (Dr. Mak cites her definition of meta-analysis to Jeremy A. Blumenthal, ‘Meta Analysis: A Primer for 




While the three-pronged organizational structure of the book is clear, the topical 
presentation and interrelations between each chapter seem frenetic and unclear. Mak introduces 
new concepts without explanation, including arcane sociolegal academic theories, and others are 
asserted as fact without any establishing citations.27 The reader is frequently left to thumb between 
pages to ascertain what the author is referring to when Mak may or may not have addressed the 
topic. Chapter one closes with a list of limitations on the present study, including the lack of 
substantive case law analysis on the development of Hong Kong law, yet the author constantly 
refers to case law for guidance.28 A study into a developing legal issue would undoubtedly benefit 
from a substantive case law analysis, especially when the role of the court is so important to the 
topic, that the book dedicates all of chapter four to discussing it. While a consistent and clear 
organizational structure could readily fix these problems, the reader will always be disappointed 
and confused by the lack depth afforded to the clear and obvious issues surrounding the allocation 
of power between parties, and the self-interested motivations that can arise when business partners 
oppose each other in court. 
 
III. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
 
 Chapter one introduces the book and provides the foundational factual background behind 
unfair prejudice proceedings in Hong Kong shareholder disputes, an explanation of what 
institutionalization is, and a summarized catalog of the book’s remaining content.29  
Dr. Mak first provides the background on Hong Kong shareholder disputes and the 
derivative concerns associated with allowing their resolution by extrajudicial procedures. Hong 
Kong is a global financial hub governed by fundamental free-market principles designed to 
encourage capitalism and economic growth,30 but sixty percent of the population is employed by 
small family businesses, not the giant corporations that dominate the economy.31 These small 
businesses are often structured by informal agreements created at the formation of the owner’s 
partnership.32 However, because Hong Kong law dictates that all businesses are governed 
 
27 See, e.g., Mak, supra note 2, at 92 (suggesting a winding-up order would be an ineffective and unreasonable 
remedy if the parties could find another solution, an order last mentioned without explanation on page six); see also, 
id. at 104 (citing the equitable considerations at stake in unfair prejudice proceedings to Ebrahimi v. Westbourne 
Galleries, Ltd. [1973] AC 360 at 379, a case last mentioned once on page seven). 
 
28 See, e.g., id. at 157 (discussing historical Hong Kong judicial animus for mediation agreements, as consistent with 
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] HKLRD 723 at 734-735); see also, MAK, 
supra note 2, at 57 (“the study of relevant case law . . . should not be ignored, as [cases] can serve as a benchmark 
for comparison with the existing case law developments. . .”).  
 
29 Id. at 1-32. 
 
30 See, id. at 38, 76. (Article 110 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that the Hong Kong government must 
safeguard the free operation of financial business and financial markets. Additionally, Article 109 requires the 
government to act to ensure that Hong Kong remains an international financial center). 
 
31 Id. at 3. 
 
32 Mak, supra note 2, at 3. 
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exclusively by the majority shareholder, a combination that lends towards disputes when personal 
tensions flare.33 When the majority shareholder of a company takes an action which unfairly 
prejudices and harms the minority’s interest, the minority can file an unfair prejudice proceeding 
with the court seeking a remedy.34 The endless variety of familial and business disagreements 
shape derivative shareholder disputes, and therefore whether the majority’s action is sufficient to 
justify a legal remedy requires an objective reasonability analysis, judged against established 
equitable principles.35 Thus Hong Kong courts are effective forums for unfair prejudice 
proceedings because the law provides them with the requisite discretionary flexibility to properly 
address the specific needs of each case.36 However, as mentioned previously, the rapid economic 
growth of Hong Kong inundated the courts with costly, lengthy, unfair prejudice proceedings, thus, 
fostering an ADR industry in the court’s stead, designed to be completely adaptable, less time 
consuming, and expensive than judicial alternatives.37 Starting with the Civil Justice Reform of  
2009, the Hong Kong government has sought to make ADR the primary method to resolve 
shareholder disputes.38  
Despite legal incentives, ADR institutionalization in Hong Kong is not yet complete. 
Institutionalization is a “process by which certain practices . . . have acquired legitimacy through 
their link to broader cultural framework of beliefs or norms that most people support and will 
therefore endorse[,]” and the institutionalization status of a practice is defined as being pre, semi, 
or fully institutionalized.39 Mak identifies three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and cultural-
cognitive.40 To properly analyze the institutional progress of ADR, Dr. Mak next explains its risks 
and the legitimacy it has and has not yet acquired under Hong Kong law. She assesses a semi-
institutional status to ADR in Hong Kong shareholder disputes because the public and legal 
professionals retain doubts about its fairness and efficacy.41 
 
33 Mak, supra note 2, at 3; see also id. at 108 n. 21 (stating majority shareholders sometimes opt to align business 
interests with their personal interests, in defiance of the firm’s best interest. William R. Scott, Financial Accounting 
Theory, 3rd ed. (Toronto Practice Hall, 2003), 273-279). 
 
34 Id. at 4-8. 
 
35 Id. at 5, 12-13 (Dr. Mak identifies three objective classifications of disputes: dissension, oppression, and 
deadlock). 
 
36 Id. at 6 (the author states this is because unfair prejudice proceedings are derived from a law designed to protect 
minority shareholders, because the 2014 Companies Ordinance Cap. 622 expanded a courts discretion in granting 
relief, and because unfair prejudice proceedings are cheaper and more flexible than other statutory alternatives). 
 
37 Id. at 6-29. (the author identifies seven basic dispute resolution methods: negotiations, facilitative mediation, 
collaboration, mini-trials, expert determination, arbitration, and court adjudication). 
 
38 Practice Direction 3.3, paras 8-11 (Hong Kong courts now compel or recommend the parties undertake some form 
of ADR before the court proceeding can continue towards a court verdict). 
 
39 Mak, supra note 2, at 16. 
 
40 Id. at 17. 
  
41 Id. at 17, 19, 79 (the Basic Law of Hong Kong “originate[s] from the free-market ideology, which is in accord 
with shared beliefs among the powerful group of elite businessmen . . . [,]” and, under the right to a court hearing, 
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Finally, the chapter ends by outlining a theoretical framework to measure the 
institutionalization of ADR in Hong Kong shareholder disputes by the progression of its societal 
legitimacy.42 Indicative of similar issues to come, the organizational structure of the introduction 
is inconsistent within itself and the rest of the book, possibly confusing the reader.43  There is a 
lack of any proper foray into the problem of self-interested parties and lawyers, even though 
chapter one provides the basis of this criticism as a fundamental concern affecting the topic.44 
Though the introduction establishes all the of the foundational background built on later, the 
inconsistent amount of explanation proffered for later chapters could confuse the reader.45 If the 
introduction were retooled to reflect the remainder of the book better, it would properly build on 
itself to introduce the remaining topics rather than providing some sort of crash course in Hong 
Kong litigation and sociological theory. Lastly, despite being a necessary inclusion, the string of 
self-imposed limitations on the present study seem both excessively harsh and arbitrary and may 
cause the reader to question the merits of the remainder of the book.46  
 
IV.  DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF ADR FOR SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES IN HONG KONG AN 
OVERVIEW 
 
 To properly introduce the factual context of the following theoretical and empirical 
analysis, chapter two restates the origin of the use of ADR in Hong Kong and how it came to 
become the industry standard for shareholder disputes.47 The primary point established in chapter 
two is that ADR and court-based shareholder proceedings are complementary and compatible with 
each other, though the author concludes the court’s future is to promote the benefits of ADR to 
skeptical legal professionals, while ADR will become the primary dispute resolution method.48  
 
treats ADR as a completely voluntary process, for which agreement is determined solely by the decision of the 
majority shareholder. The non-binding nature of ADR means the practice is relegated to an extra step in litigation). 
 
42Mak, supra note 2, at 16-32. 
 
43 Id. at 18, 28 (within the chapter, the three organizational themes are listed to imply there is nothing after the 
chapter six analysis of legal professional’s opinions on ADR. The introduction also refers to itself in a manner that 
implies there is another introductory chapter, and that the current chapter is not chapter one). 
 
44 Id. at 16 n. 69.  
 
45 See, e.g., id. at 17-25 (the author includes the definition of each type of institutionalization but reserves the 
coequally important definitions for the types of legitimacy to be established in two later chapters. Similarly, the 
author reserves explaining how institutionalization could improve for the final chapter, before proceeding to frame 
how the book will argue the point six chapters before the topic is discussed). 
 
46 Id. at 29 (the author opted only to survey lawyers for their opinions on ADR, despite rehashing, in this chapter and 
most others, the role judicial discretion plays in both remedying unfair prejudice in shareholder disputes, as well as 
when to stay proceedings to recommend parties proceed to ADR). 
 
47 Mak, supra note 2 at 30. 
 




 Dr. Mak first explains the deeper history of ADR in Hong Kong, tying the commonality of 
the practice to the specific litigative needs of an international financial hub; international 
companies prefer ADR for its flexibility and confidentiality.49 Since arbitration is a preferred 
resolution medium for international commercial disputes, to remain an international financial hub, 
Hong Kong must remain the international arbitral hub of Asia to comply with Article 109 of the 
Basic Law.50 In time, courts realized that recommending parties to an unfair prejudice proceeding 
to first use ADR before seeking court adjudication was actually a proper use of a judge’s discretion 
to manage cases because a court-affiliated ADR system was not a lesser procedure but a 
supplementary practice that could improve the court system.51 In dereliction of the precedential 
disdain for the process, and in the wake of the success of arbitration, as a means to mitigate the 
costs and duration of court-based shareholder proceedings, Hong Kong law began to encourage 
ADR to resolve shareholder disputes.52  
 Chapter two does not provide much new information for the reader and serves to represent 
the organizational flaws common throughout the book. To the reader, this chapter seems needlessly 
redundant, offering no argumentative insight into the topic and only introduces the details of the 
Hong Kong arbitral industry already discussed in chapter one.53 However, that information on 
arbitration is almost irrelevant to the remainder of the book, as “[m]ediation is now recognized as 
the primary ADR process used for the reform of the law and procedures relating to unfair prejudice 
proceedings.”54 The reader would likely not be confused if chapter one had already incorporated 
this chapter, nor would the reader be troubled should this chapter have been expanded to address 
other elements important to the topic but fall beyond the scope of the book, like other ADR 
processes or notable landmark cases. 
 
V.  KEY METHODS FOR EVALUATION OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT ON ADR IN SHAREHOLDER 
DISPUTES 
 
 To analyze the legitimacy level achieved by ADR in shareholder disputes, Dr. Mak needed 
to create her own research methodology to properly quantify any objective factors weighed in the 
decision to promote or discourage ADR from a subjective survey of Hong Kong legal 
 
49 See e.g. Mak, supra note 2, at 31. 
 
50 Id. at 34-36 (the Hong Kong arbitration industry was promoted by modernizing its law to meet international 
standards, by funding its own arbitral institution, and by innovating new practices and freedoms for parties to 
employ). 
 
51 Id. at 38-44 (the right to access court under Basic Law Article 35 meant courts could order parties to undergo 
ADR, absent their mutual agreement not to, if either party could still petition for the hearing to resume upon 
completion of the ADR method). 
 
52 Id. at 39. 
 
53 Id. at 8-15. 
 
54 Mak, supra note 2 at 15 (citing Rimsky Yuen, ‘HK a Perfect Partner in Mediation’, Conference on Asia Pacific 




professionals, and she uses chapter three to explain it.55 Dr. Mak explains that a realistic evaluation 
method is optimal because it incorporates the context, mechanisms, and potential outcomes of a 
dispute and allows the use of preexisting theories and knowledge in conjunction with data when 
constructing a methodology.56  To assess the context in which ADR has acquired legitimacy 
requires reviewing the differences between the current era of shareholder disputes which have 
legitimized ADR, and the established culture of unfair prejudice settlements that had preceded the 
2009 reforms; Dr. Mak identified reformed company law, the court’s encouragement of ADR, and 
reformed court rules as contextual factors to study.57 Dr. Mak next specifies three mechanisms that 
improve the understanding and awareness of ADR in shareholder disputes: coercive, normative, 
and mimetic mechanisms that could have institutionalized the use of ADR in shareholder 
disputes.58 Lastly, legitimization corresponds to their respective stage of institutionalization: 
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive.59   
 Dr. Mak also assesses the merits of a pluralist methodology, whereby multiple methods are 
mixed to achieve a broader understanding of the legal and non-legal factors driving 
institutionalization.60  Lastly, traditional legal study methods, comparative study methods, and 
empirical legal research comprise the author’s preferred research method.61 The traditional method 
involves a case law review and understands the law as a set of social beliefs and practices, 
including those of judges, and thus cases should include some of the social beliefs which drove 
the decision.62 Comparative study here meant comparing foreign ADR practices with those of 
Hong Kong, and the findings suggest that incorporating and imitating foreign practices is highly 
effective at driving legitimacy.63 Lastly, the empirical method was used to identify the underlying 
 
55 Mak, supra note 2, at 45-67. 
 
56 Id. at 45-48 (Dr. Mak cites the “context, mechanisms, outcome” pattern to Pawson and Tilley, ‘Realistic 
Evaluation,’ 83-88. She chose this method because it best accommodates small data sets comprised of anecdotal 
evidence of variable subjects). 
 
57 Id. at 51-53. 
 
58 Id. (coercive mechanisms are rules established by a controlling authority, and which must be followed at risk of 
punishment. Normative mechanisms stem from beliefs, habits, and values which are taken for granted, like using 
something different because you believe it to be the new norm. Mimetic mechanisms originate in the need to cope 
with uncertainty by copying established legitimate models).  
 
59 Id. at 54-55 (pragmatic legitimacy arises from a self-interested calculation to determine the best direction. Moral 
legitimacy arises when authority figures provide a moral blessing to an action. Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is 
achieved when a norm is considered as indispensable, and abidance carries similar status to a rule or law). 
 
60 Mak, supra note 2 at 58. 
 
61 Id. at 56. 
 
62 Id. at 57-59. 
 




factors affecting lawyer’s positions on ADR and helps to understand the motivations and actual 
opinions expressed by legal practitioners.64  
Given the niche size of the research topic, Dr. Mak was forced to tailor the appropriate 
sample to only 120 subjects, with three nonresponses, a risk which she defends by stating she 
sufficiently controlled her population to produce a representative sample despite the small size, 
though it does not preclude other factors from driving the findings.65 However, she does admit the 
potential for her data collection method, a five answer multiple-choice survey used to measure 
subjective opinions, to produce inaccurate results based on disparities in each subject.66 
 Having fully outlined the methodology for her empirical review of lawyerly opinions on 
ADR, the author resigns the section three full chapters from its implementation,67 another example 
of the disorganization that a reader could readily find confusing. The author also put the overall 
conclusion of the chapter, her usage of a pluralist research methodology, in the middle of the 
chapter, after speaking about the context, mechanisms, outcome model as if it was going to be 
employed.68 Given the nuance and esoteric nature associated with the field research methodologies 
of socio-legal theory, the lack of initial direction from the author means the reader could easily be 
confused about which method the author was choosing. Further, that detail and understanding will 
be three chapters stale when the reader reaches its implementation, further risking confusion.  
Among concerns with the methodology itself, the author’s limitation, the preclusion of any 
case law analysis seems indefensible after the author also stated that analyzing case law before the 
passage of the ADR legislation was necessary to ascertain the socio-legal factors that motivated 
judicial decision making.69 The author admits the risks associated with the method and presents 
the statistical analysis undertaken as a defense against accusations of bias.70 However, the author 
never explains what those statistical mechanisms do, or how they adapt the findings around bias, 
a manner any reader without an advanced understanding of predictive statistics could understand. 
The chapter should be closer to the actual study results, and it needs to organize and explain the 
specific numerical methods to be employed. 
 
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COURT: SECURING THE LEGITIMACY OF COURT-CONNECTED ADR 
INITIATIVES FOR SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES 
 
64 Mak, supra note 2 at 62. 
 
65 Id. at 63-65, 177. 
 
66 Id. at 177.  
 
67 Id. at 66 n. 101, n. 102, n. 103, n. 104 (all of these footnotes say to see chapter 6 for the discussion of the study). 
 
68 Id. at 51-60. 
 
69 Mak, supra note 2 at 60.  
 
70 See, e.g., id. at 166 (“[i]n further attempt [sic] to assess model fit, the author computed the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit test statistics. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test put observations into groups based on 
estimated probabilities then computes a Pearson Chi-square statistic based on the observed and estimated 





 Chapter four opens by assigning the courts the role of mitigating the dangers of self-interest 
in an adversarial system; the length and cost of shareholder disputes is the product of 
“unscrupulous litigants or lawyers” abusing the court rules to delay proceedings and starve the 
opponent’s resources.71 However, merely changing courtroom procedural rules is unlikely to affect 
change, and thus the author uses chapter four to analyze how a combination of ADR and the 
bench’s power to manage its cases can improve the cost and quality concerns associated with all 
shareholder disputes.72 The cooperative role between the two resolution practices is derived from 
the court’s power to encourage litigants to partake in ADR under its own oversight, affecting the 
ADR method with its own cultural-cognitive legitimacy under the rules and economic values under 
Hong Kong Basic Law.73  
For cost and quality to improve in a court-connected ADR proceeding, the parties cannot 
act unscrupulously, both by using mediation as a litigative ploy and for personal gain, and this is 
not a guarantee.74 The first argument is subject to a glaring required assumption, one that is 
validated by the author both earlier and later in the book, and one that could cause a reader to 
question the credibility of the proposal.  Some studies have already shown ADR to be just as 
lengthy and as expensive as litigation.75 The Basic Law’s guaranteed right to court compounds this 
problem, because regardless of the finality of an ADR agreement, either party can still move to 
litigation, thus relegating court-connected ADR to another step in the litigation process.76 
Next, the author suggests that courts may legitimize connected shareholder ADR 
proceedings by emphasizing the commonality between the policy objectives of court-connected 
ADR and the economic motivations within the Hong Kong Basic Law.77 By providing a more 
cost-effective dispute resolution method that enhances efficiency while increasing corporate 
autonomy, the author argues court-connected ADR is aligned with the tenets of the Basic Law and 
thus will be granted the cultural-cognitive legitimacy the Basic Law- provides.  
Upon analysis of judicial opinion to determine the accuracy of that statement, the book 
presents the second most glaring issue with an argument for greater institutionalization of ADR.78   
 
71 Mak, supra note 2, at 71. 
 
72 Id. at 72 (the quality of the ADR is defined as a measure of party autonomy and control over the proceeding). 
 
73 Id. at 73-74 (the author emphasizes this point by explaining that a court which applies to an ADR case, a system 
of rules that lacks the force of laws, the local community will subsequently treat those rules with a higher degree of 
legitimacy). 
 
74 See, e.g., id. at 16 (majority shareholders will sometimes attend ADR sessions with no intention to work towards 
an amicable settlement because the law favors them in court, and there is no prescribed minimum level of 
participation necessary for ADR). 
 
75 Id. at 169 (citing Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW, 74 (2005), 
329-404 at 396-397). 
 
76 See, e.g., Mak, supra note 2, at 139. 
 
77 Id. at 81. 
 
78 Id. at 82. 
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Court-ordered ADR fails to properly resolve disputes because it punishes parties for exercising 
their right to seek a trial under the Basic Law.79 In an effort to expedite ADR proceedings and to 
ensure the parties take them seriously, Hong Kong courts are entitled to assess costs on parties 
who refuse to go to ADR.80 Given parties in Hong Kong shareholder disputes tend to be poorer, 
so much so they generally need financial aid to afford any shareholder dispute proceedings,81 the 
threat of cost sanctions could be considered coercion, so much so that lawyers have taken to simply 
advising their clients to go to ADR in bad faith rather than absorb the sanction.82 Even if the party 
were to return to court after ADR, making ADR a step in the litigation game, the process still takes 
time and money, opposite the intended purpose of the law. This flaw supports the argument that 
self-interested motivations and an imbalanced remedy structure mars the Hong Kong shareholder 
ADR system. The stronger party can more likely absorb the additional legal costs of either 
pointless ADR proceedings or cost sanctions, rendering the entire ADR proceeding into a farce 
meant to drain the weaker party’s resources. A reader could interpret this as a failure to facilitate 
greater access to dispute resolution, a gaping hole in the author’s argument in favor of court-based 
ADR. Additionally, the reader could see this as a byproduct of a continuing oversight in the 
author’s theory favoring ADR for unfair prejudice proceedings, one that prevents the practice from 
ascending the rungs of institutionalization and legitimacy. 
The final argument presented in chapter four, that courts better address the proportionality 
concerns of minority shareholders, supports the self-interest argument against court-ordered ADR; 
the book states that courts will strike down an unfair prejudice petition upon notice that the 
respondent has made a reasonable offer to buy out the petitioner.83 Winding-up-order based 
remedies84 prevent those unscrupulous litigators from harassing the other party with unfair buyout 
offers, while also preventing those similarly devious parties from using court-ordered arbitration 
as an evidentiary fishing expedition.85 ADR would have created numerous new opportunities for 
the majority party to decimate the weaker party’s resources. The author comes unbelievably close 
to admitting this problem is still prevalent by citing to new law which prevents the disclosure of 
 
 
79 Mak, supra note 2, at 82. 
 
80 Practice Direction 31, paras. 4 and 5 (though there are no enumerated minimum participation levels in Practice 
Direction 31, examples are included in Appendix C, footnote 4). 
 
81 Mak, supra note 2, at 83-89. 
 
82 Id. at 89. 
 
83 Id. at 93. 
 
84 A winding up order refers to a court order mandating shareholders to facilitate the sale of one shareholder’s stock 
in a company to the other shareholder(s), where generally the complaining party at court is the selling shareholder. It 
is essentially a court ordered selloff meant to ensure that a fair price and deal is offered to a party seeking to leave a 
company. 
 




mediation communications,86 however this does not address concerns associated with a majority 
party pressuring the weaker party into an unfair buyout agreement.  
 
VII. REFORMS OF COMPANY LAW: LEGITIMIZING THE USE OF INFORMAL PROCESSES IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH COURT BASED SHAREHOLDER PROCEEDINGS 
 
 The recently passed Section 727 of the Companies Ordinance enables the Hong Kong Chief 
Justice to promulgate rules regulating unfair prejudice proceedings. This chapter is Dr. Mak’s 
effort to examine how the new rulemaking structure will coincide with extrajudicial and court-
based unfair prejudice proceedings, specifically how the court may now create rules that require 
parties to consider or undergo ADR processes in unfair prejudice proceedings. 87 Again the author 
addresses the symptoms of self-interested litigants, and again fails to extrapolate how the issue 
could affect mandatory ADR processes, instead asserting, without citation, that it the effect such a 
situation will have on minority shareholder rights is uncertain.88 Instead, the author uses chapter 
five to assert that the corporate policy conventions under the new rules balance the flexibility of 
ADR proceedings with the need to protect minority shareholders from intrinsic procedural 
imbalances. The author does this by acknowledging that corporate legal structures which enable 
total internal control over shareholder disputes can result in abuse by the majority shareholders, 
albeit a rare occurrence.89  
The argument states a strong legal framework paired with an efficient court enforcement 
system is a prerequisite to protect minority shareholders from controlling shareholders, and that 
available, efficient dispute resolution systems are perquisites for an efficient court and economic 
system.90 Thus, the author concludes, incorporating ADR further into statutory unfair prejudice 
practices will open access to resolution structures, which enables a potent enforcement system, 
which thus protects the minority shareholders from controlling majority interests by providing a 
wider selection of remedies to a breach of their rights.91  
Any reader will notice that the author is precluding the ability of the minority shareholder 
to adequately acquire remedies for the breach of their rights by the majority. Rather, the author 
asserts that a wider pool of remedial choices constitutes sufficient protections for the minority 
interest simply because it offers more party choices, and also because private ADR remedies 
 
86 Mak, supra note 2, at 96, citing Section 8(2) of the Mediation Ordinance (Cap. 620). 
 
87 Id. at 104. 
 
88 Id. at 89 n. 93, 106, 107. (forced ADR only serves to increase the time commitment and costs of an unfair 
prejudice proceeding by functioning as an extra step in the litigation game); Hazel Genn et al., Twisting Arms: Court 
Referred and Court Linked Mediation Under Judicial Pressure Ministry of Justice Research Series, Series 1/07 
(2007) at 15. 
 
89 Id. at 107. (citing William R. Scott, Financial Accounting Theory, 3rd ed. (Toronto Practice Hall, 2003), 273-
279). 
 
90 Id. at 110, 111. 
 
91 Mak, supra note 2, at 112.  
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cannot achieve the guaranteed efficiency and fairness associated with a court-ordered winding-up 
proceeding as mentioned above.92   
 Next, the author presents the pitfall in caseloads in American civil courts as evidence that 
people consider ADR as an adjudicative process that is compatible with the goals and purposes of 
the courts, and again fails to present an explanation for how the imbalance of power between 
majority and minority shareholders can derogate the rights of the minority.93 Dr. Mak attempts to 
show a lack of coercion present when arbitration proceedings are forced by law or by court order 
by stating that civilians must uphold their legal commitments or else risk damaging the legitimacy 
of them.94 Any reader would note that this argument fails even to assert a lack of coercion; that a 
person is obligated to honor their legal commitments when they involve tolerating a loss of a 
fundamental right just because the rulemaking body depends on acquiescence to survive, cannot 
be considered an exercise of choice. This argumentative weakness is highlighted by the author’s 
later references to the uncertainty of the future as a justification against enforcement of consensual 
mediation agreements.95 The conclusion to chapter five, that ADR and court proceedings are 
compatible and complementary programs that also offer intrinsic benefits in unfair prejudice 
disputes, is so predicated on logical fallacies that it has the potential to destroy any credibility the 
reader still holds for the author’s arguments. Properly addressing the vulnerability to majority 
abuse in Hong Kong’s shareholder ADR system would have properly fixed chapter five. 
 
VIII. DIFFUSION OF PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HONG KONG 
LAWYER’S ATTITUDES ABOUT THE USE OF ADR FOR SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES 
 
Chapter six is the empirical analysis meant to reinforce the author’s numerous hypothesis 
and preexisting arguments about the status of institutionalization of ADR as applied in shareholder 
disputes.96 Dr. Mak suggests that ADR needs the acceptance of legal professionals and their 
professional organizations to achieve full institutionalization because the status requires changing 
the fundamental “dichotomous win-lose” nature of the adversarial courtroom so that lawyers can 
help their clients pursue consensual settlement solutions through ADR.97 Immediately, a diligent 
reader could notice the author has again overlooked self-interested motivations for this type of 
lawyering, instead arguing the culture of the trial structure needs to be changed to accommodate 
ADR.98 Moreover, the author assumes that lawyers do not want the current type of court 
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proceedings to continue over the alternative dispute resolution options, even though the author’s 
position requires admitting that lawyers would risk sacrificing their financial and social status to 
change the system.99 In response, the author suggests that lawyers would take this risk because it 
presents an opportunity to raise their own social status by being one of the few who provide low-
cost ADR representation.100 
Next Dr. Mak explains how she extracted the factors which dictate lawyer’s opinions on 
ADR, generating six factors: compatibility, advantages, barriers, familiarity, network association 
and legal culture.101 Using the method outlined in chapter three, Dr. Mak consolidated the answers 
from her survey into broader categories, then performed a series of statistic calculations to yield 
factor loading coefficient values, which indicate the best combination of factors explain any 
variance from her hypothesized answers.102  
Addressing the findings on each factor, Dr. Mak first addresses compatibility, or a 
perceived degree of compatibility between court-based unfair prejudice proceedings and ADR, 
and found the factor produced a positive correlation supporting ADR adoption by survey 
respondents.103  
Next,  Dr. Mak highlights her findings of an inverse correlation between a Hong Kong 
lawyer’s awareness of the advantages ADR offers over formal court-based remedies and methods 
and the likelihood that Hong Kong lawyer will recommend or employ ADR in his career.104 Dr. 
Mak suggested the deep-rooted cultural implications of winner-take-all lawyering derives this 
correlation,105 however, this could also be explained by lawyer’s self-interested desire not to 
sacrifice a more lucrative line of work in exchange for a change of structure. There is a possibility 
that lawyers who are aware of the benefits of ADR are also aware of the risk of sham mediation 
as permitted under the current legal hierarchy. Lawyers, either adversarial or ameliorative, seek to 
achieve a beneficial outcome for their client, and entering into mediation when it carries the risk 
of being a waste of the client’s time and money may explain such hostility to the practice. 
Barriers, or inhibitions associated with ADR that are not associated with court-based 
shareholder proceedings, generated an unexpectedly positive correlation, suggesting the presence 
of issues like enforceability of the mediation agreement, and the risk parties will use the ADR 
hearings to trawl for discovery or delay proceedings, causes lawyers to recommend ADR.106 The 
 
99 Mak, supra note 2, at 137-148, 158 (Dr. Mak first acknowledges that the legal profession is monopolized by 
lawyers, who establish high barriers to entry into the field, then use their monopoly to create normative legitimacy 
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author suggests the court’s case-by-case case management powers may offer a more consistent 
means to enforce mediated agreements.107 
Lawyers familiar with the ADR process are more likely to employ ADR to help their 
clients, with a significant margin of support associated with the mitigated inequality imposed on 
the smaller party when their attorney was familiar with ADR processes.108  
Professional network affiliation with ADR presented inconclusive evidence towards or 
against individual practitioners utilizing ADR, and the author could not conclusively determine 
whether Hong Kong lawyers were capable or incapable of acting in accordance with the friendlier 
notions of ADR proceedings.109 
 Lastly, a legal certainty that minority shareholders will receive judicial relief does not 
affect legal professional’s opinions of ADR and if they would be more or less likely to employ it 
as a result.110 
 
IX. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO THE FUTURE CODIFICATION OF ADR FOR SHAREHOLDER 
DISPUTES IN HONG KONG: BORROWING MODELS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, NEW 
ZEALAND, AND SOUTH AFRICA.  
 
 The penultimate chapter of the book harkens back to mimetic legitimacy111 to fill the lack 
of research into how to use policy to institutionalize ADR in shareholder dispute resolution further. 
Dr. Mak does this by analyzing the legal treatment affected on ADR by three other common law 
countries, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and South Africa. The analysis creates three policy 
suggestions, derived respectively from one per country: 1) a company law rule that permits the 
parties to include an arbitration clause in the articles of association of the company, thereby 
assuring all shareholder disputes are subject binding arbitration, 2) mandatory ADR provisions 
included in the national company law, and 3) issuing a voluntary company law which recommends 
companies use ADR to resolve shareholder disputes and requires disclosure of how the company 
addressed said disputes.112 
 The author adapted these findings to accommodate the purely voluntary nature of Hong 
Kong ADR proceedings and suggested that future studies could seek out more law, or potentially 
original suggestions as well.113 The same was done as it pertains to subject matter inarbitrability, 
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 Dr. Mak wrote Alternative Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Disputes in Hong Kong: 
Institutionalizing its Effective Use, to examine and offer potential means to legitimize ADR in 
unfair prejudice proceedings.115 The book offers a comprehensive history of the use of ADR in 
Hong Kong business, an introduction and explanation for numerous sociological examination 
methods and standards, and finally concludes that there is no current consensus surrounding the 
use of ADR in shareholder disputes. In offering her theories surrounding the lack of consensus, 
Dr. Mak considers and discusses numerous possible explanations, but consistently fails to measure 
the possible influence self-interest, both on the part of the lawyer and the client, may have on the 
pre-institutionalized status of ADR. Regardless, she still offers numerous and valid mechanisms 
to advance the use of ADR, each of which she designs to suit the unique nature of the Hong Kong 
economy properly. Her final conclusion is that the judiciary, legislature, and the professional legal 
sphere must all work to encourage the use of ADR before the practices gain more legitimacy, and 
she invites future studies to better explain the best means to achieve that end. 
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